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PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 102 
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING 
AND DISCLOSURE ACT 
Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
of 1959 (LMRDA) 1 secures to members of labor unions certain 
fundamental rights. 2 Section 6093 of the LMRDA makes it unlawful 
for a union to discipline its members for exercising rights guaran-
teed by any provision of the Act. In ord~r to vindicate the rights 
secured by Title I, or to obtain the protection afforded by section 
609, a union member may, pursuant to section 102 4 of the 
LMRDA, bring an action in federal district court against his union 
or its officers. 
It is firmly established that in a suit brought under section 102, a 
union member may ordinarily recover compensatory damages for 
any injury proximately caused by a violation of Title I or section 
609.5 The courts are divided,6 however, on the question of whether 
a plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages7 under section 102. 
This article will address that question by discussing the language 
and the legislative history of section 102, the conflicting decisions 
of the federal courts, and the relevant policy considerations. 
I 29 U .s.c. §§ 40)-53) (1970). 
2 Subsections IOl(a)(l)-(5) of the LMRDA provide that union members shall have equal 
rights and privileges, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom from arbitrary increases in 
dues and assessments, freedom to sue, and certain procedural safeguards against discipline 
by their unions. 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(l)-(5) (1970). 
3 29 U .s.c. § 529 (1970). 
4 29 u.s.c. § 412 (1970). 
5 See Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1018-19 (4th Cir. 
1965); McCraw v. Plumbers, 341 F.2d 705, 710 (6th Cir. 1965); Vars v. International Bhd. of 
Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943, 952 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd on other grounds, 320 F.2d 576 
(2d Cir. 1963). Damages may be awarded, for example, to compensate a plaintiff for wages 
lost as a result of his wrongful expulsion from the union, for strike benefits not received 
during an unlawful suspension, or for medical expenses incurred on account of a physical 
injury caused by a violation of the plaintiff's rights. See McCraw v. Plumbers, 341 F.2d 705, 
710 (6th Cir. 1965) (by implication); Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F. 
Supp. 943, 952 (D. Conn. 1963) (by implication), ajf'd on other grounds, 320 F.2d 576 (2d 
Cir. 1963). Some courts have held, however, that damages for mental suffering are not· 
recoverable under§ 102 in the absence of a concomitant physical injury. See note 59 infra. 
6 See notes 29-31 and accompanying text infra. 
7 Punitive damages are an element of recovery over and above full compensation of the 
plaintiff for any injury he has sustained. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 908(1) (Tent. 
Draft No. 19, 1973) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS]; w. PROSSER, 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 197q [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER]. They 
commonly are awarded in tort actions where the defendant has acted with malice, an evil or 
.outrageous motive, or a conscious disregard of the rights and interests of others. RESTATE-
529 
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I. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
l 
Section 102 provides that a union member may bring suit for 
"such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. " 8 This 
provision was introduced as an amendment on the floor of the 
Senate,9 and as part of a substitute bill on the floor of the House of 
Representatives. 10 Like many other sections of the LMRDA which 
were written on the floor of Congress, section 102 is ambiguous .11 
Both its language and its legislative history are inconclusive on the 
issue of whether a plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages. 
Several arguments have been advanced that the language of 
section 102 rules out the availability of exemplary damages. The 
absence of an express provision for punitive damages may indicate 
a congressional intent that they not be recoverable under section 
102. 12 Furthermore, because punitive damages are more in the 
nature of punishment and restraint than of relief, the use of the 
word "relief' in section 102 might indicate that these damages may 
not be awarded. 13 Finally, the insertion into section 102 of the 
parenthetical phrase, "including injunctions," may have been in-
tended to limit plaintiffs solely to equitable remedies. 14 
None of these arguments, however, is. conclusive. Since section 
102 is a catchall provision which does· hot purport to list exhaus-
tively appropriate forms of relief, the absence of an explicit au-
thorization of punitive damages is not necessarily probative of 
congressional intent. 15 Neither should much reliance be placed 
MENT (SECOND) OF TOR.TS§ 908(2); C. McC:oRM°iCK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 
§ 79, at 280 (1935) [hereinafter cited as C. McCoRMICK]; W. PROSSER,§ 2, at 9-10; see, e.g., 
Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 18 A.D.2d 331, 239N.Y.S.2d 792 (1%3) (common law action by union 
members against union). 
8 29 u.s.c. § 412 (1970). 
9 105 CONG. REc. 6694 (1959), reprinted in II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, 1959, at 1221 (1959) [hereinafter 
cited as LEG. His. LMRDA]. 
10 105 CONG. REC. 14345 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. H1s. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1520. 
11 See Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 
MICH. L. REv. 819, 852 (1960). 
12 Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277, 280-81 (W.D.N.C. 1%3); 
see also McCraw v. Plumbers, 341 F.2d 705, 710 (6th Cir. 1965) (The absence of a provision 
for attorney's fees indicates that such fees may not be awarded under § ·102.). 
13 Cole v. Hall, 35 F.R.D. 4, 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); see also International Bhd. of Boilermak-
ers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 315 (9th Cir. 1%5) ("Relief" may be an inappropriate word to 
describe money damages of any kind.). 
14 This argument was made by the defendants in Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile 
Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1965), and Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 
802, 241 F. Supp. 895,909 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In both cases the argument was rejected by the 
courts. 
15 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 10 (1973) (Section 102 does not "meticulously detail". 
forms of relief, so attorney's fees may be recovered despite the absence of an express· 
provision.). 
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upon the technical meaning of the word "relief," since it is com-
monly used in a comprehensive manner. 16 Finally, it does not 
appear that the cause of action created by section 102 is exclusively 
equitable. 17 Indeed, the phrase, "including injunctions," was prob-
ably added in order to broaden the relief available under section 
102, not to narrow it. 18 
The legislative history of the LMRDA is silent on the specific 
question of whether punitive damages may be awarded under sec-
tion 102. 19 It has been argued that the absence of any consideration 
of this issue indicates a congressional intent that exemplary dam-
ages should not be recoverable. 20 The lack of any directly relevant 
legislative history, however, may indicate an assumption on the 
part of Congress that punitive damages would be awarded in ap-
propriate cases. 
The legislative history of the LMRDA does contain statements 
by members of Congress concerning the avaiiability under section 
102 of monetary damages in general. Senator Goldwater declared 
that section 102 would not provide sufficient incentive for union 
members to sue, because the availability of damages was ex-
tremely limited. 21 Representative Elliott stated, however, that the 
federal courts would have "wide latitude to grant relief according 
to the necessities of the case." 22 Since Representative Elliott was a 
sponsor of section 102,23 his statement is entitled to greater weight 
than. Senator Goldwater's comment. 24 Both statements are incon-
16 See International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968). 
17 Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1965); 
Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
18 Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 354 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1968); 
Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1965). The 
parenthetical phrase may have been designed to negative any inference that injunctive relief 
should not be available under § 102; this inference might have been drawn from the 
Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U .S.C. §§ IOI-I 15 (1970), which provides that no federal court 
may issue an injunction in a case involving a labor dispute, except as specifically permitted 
by that Act. 
•• International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968). 
20 See Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 227,280 (W.D.N.C. 1963). 
21 105 CONG. REC. 10095 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. His. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1281. 
Senator Goldwater stated that § 102 would offer the successful plaintiff "little in the way of 
monetary damages except in the rare case where the plaintiff's job rights or job tenure have 
been adversely affected." Id. But see 105 Corm. REc. 15689 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. Hts. 
LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1632 (Rep. O'Hara) (Monetary damages would be widely avail, 
able under § 102.). 
22 105 CONG. REC. 15548 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. Hts. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1584. 
See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 13 (1973); Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348,353, 354(3d 
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1968). 
23 Representative Elliott introduced H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in I 
LEG. Hts. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 687-758, which contained the original version of§ 102. 
105 CONG. REC. 14177 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. Hts. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1517. 
24 In construing a statute, primary attention should be given to the views expressed by its 
legislative sponsors. Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 353 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 
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elusive, however, since they do not deal directly with the question 
of punitive damages. 
Also inconclusive is the presence in the LMRDA of section 
103,25 which preserves the rights and remedies of union members 
under state law. Since state courts have commonly sustained the 
availability of punitive damages in member-union litigation, 26 it can 
be argued that Congress impliedly placed its imprimatur on puni-
tive damages when it enacted section 103.27 Congress may have 
decided, however, that exemplary damages were unnecessary 
under section 102, because they are available under state law. 28 
II. THE CASE LAW 
The three circuit courts which have considered the issue have 
held that punitive damages may be awarded under section 102. 29 
Although the district courts have been divided on this question,30 
U.S. 1040 (1968). See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, li-12 (1973), where the Supreme Court 
explicitly repudiated Senator Goldwater's accompanying statement that attorney's fees 
would not be available under§ 102, 105 CONG. REc. 10095 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. Hts. 
LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1281. 
25 29 u.s.c. § 413 (1970). 
26 Brandwen, Punitive-Exemplary Damages in Labor Relations Litigation, 29 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 460(1962);see, e.g., Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 18A.D.2d 331, 239N.Y.S.2d 792 (1963). 
27 Moreover, it would be desirable to coordinate the LMRDA with state law, so as to 
avoid a clash of remedies. Summers, Pre-emption and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights 
and Remedies, 22 OHIO STATE L.J. 119, 122-23, 145 (1961). 
28 Since§ 103 was designed to avoid federal preemption of state rights and remedies, state 
law may in some ways provide greater protection to union members than the LMRDA. /d., 
at 124-25; see also Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do In Fact, 70 
YALE L.J. 175, 176 (1960). 
29 Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976); Cooke v. Orange 
Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976); International Bhd. of 
Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968). 
30 The following cases have held that punitive damages are available under§ 102: Berg v. 
Watson, 417 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Woods v. Local 613, lnt'I Bhd. of Elec. 
Worlcers, 404 F. Supp. 110 (N .D. Ga. 1975); Sipe v. Local 191, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 
393 F. Supp. 865 (M.D. P-a. 1975); Yablonski v. United Mine Worlcers, 80 L.R.R.M. 3435, 
(D.D.C. 1972); Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cole v. Hall, 80 
L.R.R.M. 2267 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), ajf'd on other grounds, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972), ajf'd, 
412 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting a prior preliminary holding in the same case, reported in 35 
F.R.D. 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), that punitive damages may not be awarded under§ 102); Patrick 
v. I.D. Packing Co., 308 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Iowa 1969); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Barbourv. Sheet Metal Worlcers Int'I Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 
1966), rev' don other grounds, 401 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1968); Farowitz v. Associated Musi-
cians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
The following cases have held that exemplary damages may not be awarded under§ 102: 
Magelssen v. Local 518, Operative Plasterers, 240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (alterna-
tive holding); Keenan v. District Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 59 L.R.R.M. 2510 
(E.D. P-a. 1965); Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 
1963). 
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the trend is clearly in favor of allowing the recovery of exemplary 
damages. 31 
The conflicting decisions cannot be reconciled on the basis of 
any relevant factor. The recoverability of punitive damages under 
section 102 has been unaffected by the provision of Title I under 
which the cause of action arose. 32 Moreover, the decisions have 
not been influenced by whether the alleged violation of Title I was 
committed by an individual union officer, a union disciplinary 
tribunal, or a vote of the union membership. 33 Neither have the 
courts used the recoverability of punitive damages and the availa-
bility of either attorney's fees 34 or compensatory damages for 
mental suffering35 as substitutes for each other. 
31 A clear majority of the decisions, including every decison since ·1965, have held that 
punitive damages are allowable under § 102. See notes 29-30 supra. 
32 The decisions holding that punitive damages may not be awarded under § 102 involved 
alleged violations of§ lOl(a)(I), (2), or (5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(I), (2), (5) 
(1970). For a description of these provisions. see note 2 supra. Magelssen v. Local 518, 
Operative Plasterers, 240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (§ 101(a)(5)); Keenan v. District 
Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 59 L.R:R.M. 2510 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (§ IOl(a)(2), (5)); 
Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963) (§ IOl(a)(I), 
(2), (5)). 
Many of the cases holding that exemplary damages are allowable involved the same 
provisions. Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976) (§ I0l(a)(2)); 
International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
391 U.S. 935 (1968) (§ J0l(a)(5)); Berg v. Watson, 417 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (§ IOI 
(a)(5)); Woods v. Local 613, Int'I Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 404 F. Supp. I IO (N.D. Ga. 1975) 
(§ IOl(a)(I)); Barbour v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'! Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 401 F. 2d 152 (6th Cir. 1968) (§ IOl(a)(2), (5)); Farowitz v. 
Associated Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (§ IOl(a)(2)). 
33 The cases holding that punitive damages are unavailable under § 102 concerned an 
alleged violation of Title I by individual union officers, Burris v. International Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963); by a trial committee of the union's district 
council, Keenan v. District Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 59 L.R.R.M. 2510 (E.D. 
Pa. 1965); and by a vote of the entire local membership, Magelssen v. Local 518, Operative 
Plasterers, 240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965). 
Title I violations at all three of these organizational levels may also be found among the 
cases sustaining the recoverability of exemplary damages. Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. 
Council of Painters No. 48, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976) (district council); International Bhd. 
of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968) 
(vote of membership); Berg v. Watson, 417 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (individual 
officers); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 80 L.R.R.M. 3435 (D.D.C 1972) (individual 
officer); Cole v. Hall, 80 L.R.R.M. 2267 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd on other grounds, 462 F.2d 
777 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 412 U.S. I (1973) (vote of membership); Barbour v. Sheet Metal 
Workers lnt'l Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1966), rev' don other grounds, 401 F.2d 
152 (6th Cir. 1968) (international association trial committee). 
34 Two decisions have held that awards of both punitive damages and counsel fees may be 
made under§ 102. Berg v. Watson, 417 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Sands v. Abelli, 290 
F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Conversely, in Magelssen v. Local 518, Operative Plasterers, 
240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965), the court held that neither remedy may be given. 
Moreover, if punitive damages were being used in place of attorney's fees, then one would 
expect the trend in favor of the recoverability of exemplary damages to have been halted by 
the Supreme Court's holding in Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I (1973), that counsel fees may be 
awarded to a successful plaintiff under § 102. Since Hall was decided in 1973, however, 
numerous decisions have held that punitive damages are available under§ 102, while no case 
has held to the contrary. See notes 29-3 I and accompanying text supra. 
35 In Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, 529 F. 2d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 
1976), the Ninth Circuit referred to its !)rior holding in _International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. 
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Finally, decisions sustaining the recoverability of punitive dam-
ages under section 102 have not always involved more outrageous 
behavior by the defendant than cases to the contrary. Thus, in 
Burris v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 36 the plaintiffs 
alleged that they were induced to withdraw from the union by 
misrepresentations of union officers, and were subsequently 
blacklisted, because they had accused the officers of failing to 
bring timely unfair labor practice charges against their employer. 
Despite the outrageous nature of the alleged Title I violation, the 
court held that punitive damages may not be awarded under sec-
tion 102.37 
In contrast, the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct is 
much less striking in two cases where the plaintiffs were awarded 
exemplary damages. During a dispute about the union business 
manager's allegedly discriminatory assignment of jobs, the plaintiff 
in International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Braswell38 struck 
the business manager in the face. A union trial committee con-
victed the plaintiff, inter alia, of violating a provision of the union 
constitution, which prohibited a member from using force with the 
purpose of preventing a union officer from discharging his duties. 
This conviction was ratified by a vote of the membership, where-
upon the plaintiff was expelled from the union. The court found 
that, when he struck the business manager, the plaintiff did not 
intend to prevent the officer from discharging his duties, and thus 
held that the plaintiff's conduct was not proscribed by the union 
constitution. The court further held that the union was not entitled 
to discipline a member for conduct not expressly forbidden by its 
constitution or bylaws.39 Although the plaintiff was awarded puni-
tive damages, the union's action was not an obvious violation of his 
rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court subsequently held that unions 
may discipline their members for implied offenses, and that federal 
courts have no authority to interpret union regulations in order to 
determine the scope of offenses for which members may be 
Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965), that damages for emotional distress may not be 
recovered under§ 102 absent an accompanying physical injury, and proceeded to hold that 
punitive damages are allowable. Two courts have held, however, that both exemplary and 
mental suffering damages are available under§ 102. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 80 
L.R.R.M. 3435 (D.D.C. 1972); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Con-
versely, one court, in separate proceedings of the same case, held that neither type of 
damages may be awarded under§ 102. Keenan v. District Council, United Bhd. of Carpen-
ters, 266 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (damages for mental suffering); 59 L.R.R.M. 2510 
(E.D. Pa. 1965) (punitive damages). 
36 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963). 
37 Id. at 280-81. 
38 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968). 
39 Id. at 198-99. 
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punished. 4° Consequently, today the union's action would be held 
not to violate Title I at all. 
Similarly, in Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 41 the 
plaintiff was expelled from his union for advocating the nonpay-
ment of union dues. Finding that the plaintiff's advocacy of non-
payment was based upon a good faith belief that the dues were 
illegally imposed, the court held that his expulsion violated the free 
speech provision of section 10l(a)(2).42 Although the plaintiff's 
activities posed a threat to the financial survival of the union, the 
court found that the conduct of the officers responsible for the 
plaintiff's expulsion was sufficiently outrageous to justify an award 
of punitive damages. 43 
In both Robins v. Schonfeld44 and Cole v. Hall, 45 it was held that 
although punitive damages are available under section 102, the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover these damages on the facts of 
the cases. Yet each case involved considerably more outrageous 
conduct by the defendant than either Braswell or Farowitz, in 
which exemplary damages were awarded. In Robins, the plaintiff 
was officially suspended from union activities and unofficially 
blacklisted, because he criticized the procedures used in two union 
elections in which he had been an unsuccessful candidate. The 
union lifted his suspension after two weeks pending the outcome of 
the litigation, but its blacklisting of the plaintiff remained in effect 
for three years. Nevertheless, the court refused to grant the plain-
tiff punitive damages. 46 Similary, in Cole, the plaintiff was expelled 
for introducing at a union meeting a series of resolutions which 
were critical of the union's policies on hiring and working condi-
tions. Although the plaintiff and the defendant union officer had 
previously run against each other in a bitterly contested union 
election, the court found that the plaintiff was expelled in good 
faith, and thus was not entitled to punitive· damages. 47 
In accordance with the practice at common law, 48 all of the 
decisions sustaining the availability of punitive damages under 
40 International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971). See Beaird & 
Player, Union Discipline of Its Membership Under Section JOJ(a)(5) of Landrum-Griffin: 
What Is "Discipline" and How Much Process is Due?, 9 GA. L. REv. 383, 400-01 (1975). 
41 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N. Y. 1965). . 
42 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (1970). 
43 241 F. Supp. at 909. 
44 326 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
45 80 L.R.R.M. 2267 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd on other grounds, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972), 
affd, 412 U.S. I (1973). 
46 Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
47 Cole v. Hall, 80 L.R.R.M. 2267, 2271 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd on other grounds, 462 
F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 412 U.S. I (1973). 
48 See note 7 supra. 
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section 102 have held that these damages may be awarded only 
where the defeno;mt has acted with malice or with a reckless 
indifference to the plaintiff's rights. 49 This standard, however, has 
been extremely difficult to administer. When contrasted with 
Braswell and Farowitz; Robins and Cole evince a significant risk 
that the application of the standard of malice or reckless indiffer-
ence will lead to arbitrary or capricious results in litigation arising 
under section 102. 
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Since the language and the legislative history of section 102 are 
ambiguous,50 the determination of whether punitive damages are 
an appropriate form of relief under that provision must ultimately 
rest upon an analysis of the competing policy consideratiorts.51 
One of the principal purposes of the LMRDA was to deter impro-
per union conduct.52 Accordingly, it•has been argued that awarding 
punitive damages under section 102 would serve to deter unions 
from infringing upon the. Title I rights of their members.53 This 
argument is consistent with the traditional common law theory that 
exemplary damages deter objectionable conduct by threatening to 
make it costly. 54 _ . 
As several commentators have observed, however, there is no 
objective evidence indicating either that punitive damages actually 
49 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 
1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525, 531 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cole v. Hall, 80 L.R.R.M. 2267, 2271 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd on other· 
grounds, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 412 U.S . .I (1973); Farowitz v. Associated 
Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
50 See notes 8-28 and accompanying text supra. 
51 See Cox, supra note 11, at 852. Noting that much of the LMRDA was hastily written 
and that it contains many deliberate ambiguities and political compromises, Professor Cox 
counseled that "courts would be well advised to.seek out the underlying rationale without 
placing great emphasis upon close construction of the words." Id. 
52 Section 2(c) of the LMRDA states in part: "The Congress ... finds and declares that 
the enactment of this chapter is necessary to eliminate or prevent improper practices on the 
part oflaboroiganizations .... " 29 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1970). See also Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. 
Supp. 677, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
53 See, e.g., Cooke v: Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, 529 F.2d 815,820 (9th 
Cir. 1976); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Woods v. Local 613, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 404 F. 
Supp. 110, 118 (N .D. Ga. 1975); Sipe v. Local 191, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 393 F. Supp. 
865, 871 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Sands v. Abelli, 290.F. Supp. 677, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at§ 908(1), comment a; C. McCOR-
MICK, supra note 7, § 77, at 275; W. PRossER, supra note 7, § 2, _at 9, 11; Morris, Punitive 
Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1183 (1931); Note, The Imposition of 
Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N. Y. U.L. REv. 1158, 
I 162 (1966). 
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deter undesirable behavior, or that they do so more effectively than 
compensatory damages.55 This lack of evidence may imply more 
about the difficulty of garnering proof than about the efficacy of 
punitive damages. Nevertheless, there is reason to doubt that the 
threat of exemplary damages would actually deter unions from 
infringing upon the rights of their members. The application of the 
gialice or reckless indifference standard has often led to decisions 
under section 102 which are unpredictable, if not arbitrary or 
capricious.56 Lacking a clear understanding of the kind of behavior 
which would subject them to liability for punitive damages, unions 
would find it extremely difficult to conduct their affairs so as to 
avoid such liability. 5 7 
Moreover, the liability of unions for compensatory damages 
under section 102 may already sufficiently deter conduct which 
violates members' rights.58 The possibility that a plaintiff will re-
cover for mental suffering, even in the absence of a concomitant 
physical injury, 59 makes the threat of compensatory damages a 
particularly effective deterrent. Damages for emotional distress are 
likely to be generously assessed by a jury sympathetic to the 
plaintiff.60 
The efficacy of Title I and section 609 of the LMRDA depends 
upon the willingness of union members to vindicate their rights by 
bringing actions under section 102. 61 At common law, the availabil-
55 See Brandwen, supra note 26, at 465-66; Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which 
Should Be Abolished, in THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4, 11 (1969); Ghiardi, 
Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished?, A Statement for the Affirmative, in ABA SEC. OF 
INS., NEG. & COMP. LAW 282, 288 (1965). 
56 See notes 38-49 and accompanying text supra. 
57 Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 302 (Brennan, J., concurring), 311-12 (White, J., 
concurring), 354 n.124 (Marshall, J., concurring) (1972) (infrequency and arbitrariness of 
infliction of death penalty suggests that it is not an effective deterrent). 
58 Compensatory damages are recoverable under§ 102. See note 5 and accompanying text 
supra. The threat of such damages may deter undesirable conduct. Brandwen, supra note 
26, at 465-66; Duffy, supra note 55, at 11; Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 
in THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15 (1969); Ghiardi, supra note 55, at 288. 
·
59 The courts are divided over the question of whether mental suffering is compensable 
under § 102 in the absence of an accompanying physical injury. Decisions holding that 
mental suffering alone is compensable include: Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile 
Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1018-19 (4th Cir. 1965); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 81 
L.R.R.M. 2592, 2593-94 (D.D.C. 1972); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968). Decisions holding that mental suffering is not compensable in the absence of a 
physical injury include: International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 315 
(9th Cir. 1965); Talavera v. Teamsters Local 85, 351 F. Supp. 155, 158-59 (N.D. Cal. 1972); 
Archibald v. Local 57, Int'! Union of Operating Engineers, 276 F. Supp. 326, 333 (D.R.I. 
1967); Keenan v. District Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 266 F. Supp. 497, 500 (E.D. 
Pa. 1966). . 
60 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at § 908, comment c. 
61 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1973); Cox, supra note 11, at 852. The originai 
Senate version of§ 102 provided exclusively for enforcement by the Secretary of Labor. In 
an effort to avoid overburdening the Labor Department, however, the Senate amended this 
provision to authorize suits only by union members. 105 CONG. REc. 6476, 6486, 6487, 6491 
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ity of punitive damages has been defended on the ground that it 
induces injured persons to sue, despite the attendant trouble and 
expense. 62 Accordingly, it can be argued that exemplary damages 
should be recoverable under section 102, in order to give union 
members, whose rights have been infringed, an incentive to litigate 
their claims. 
Some such incentive may be necessary, because significant ob-. 
stacles stand in the way of suits by members against their unions. 
Since many union members lack extensive financial resources, the 
cost of litigation may constitute a barrier to actions under section 
102.63 Additionally, where unions violate the rights of their mem-
bers without inflicting any tangible damage,64 many members may 
be discouraged from bringing suit because, even if successful, they 
would obtain only a negligible financial recovery. These members 
might decide that it is not worth shouldering the substantial bur-
dens of litigation merely to vindicate intangible rights. 65 
Although some inducement to litigation under section 102 may 
be necessary in order to overcome these obstacles, it is highly 
questionable whether punitive damages are needed to serve this 
purpose. In Hall v. Cole, 66 the Supreme Court held that a success-
ful plaintiff may be awarded attorney's fees under section 102. 
(1959), reprinted in II LEG. HIS. LMRDA, supra note 9, at 1102, 111.3, 1114, 1117. See also 
Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 349-50 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1968); 
Comment, Labor Law-Mandatory Attorney's Fees-Section 102 Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act, 51 DEN. L.J. 169, 174 (1974). 
62 C. McCORMICK, supra note 7, § 77, at 276-77; W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 2, at 11; 
Coiboy, Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished? A Statement for the Negative, in ABA 
SEc. oF INS., NEG. & COMP. LAW 292, 294 (1%5); Morris, supra note 54, at 1183; Note, 
supra note 54, at 1162. 
63 Cox, supra note II, at 853. See also Comment, Title I of the LMRDA: Rights and 
Remedies of Union Members With Respect to Their Unions, 11 WILLAMETTE L.J. 258, 261 
(1975). Union members may also be deterred from bringing§ 102 suits by their unfamiliarity 
with the law and their hesitancy to become involved with the law, as well as by a fear of 
union reprisals. Cox, supra note 11, at 853. See also Comment, at 261. Although any 
retributive action by the union would likely constitute a fresh violation of the LMRDA or of 
some other statute, the fear of reprisals may nevertheless exist among many union members. 
64 Such circumstances are not uncommon. See Comment, supra note 61, at 175. 
65 See Cox, supra note 11, at 853; Comment, supra note 63, at 261. It can be argued that 
punitive damages should be recoverable under § I 02 not as a means of encouraging litigation 
by union members who sustain no concrete damage from infringements upon their rights, 
but as a means of affording union members full compensation for injuries which are difficult 
to prove. In some jurisdictions, however, it has been held that a plaintiff may recover 
damages for mental suffering under § 102, even in the absence of a concomitant physical 
injury. See note 59 supra. At least in those jurisdictions, the allowance of exemplary 
damages would seem entirely unnecessary to ensure the full compensation of the plaintiff. In 
practice, damages for emotional distress are frequently a~sessed in an amount greater than is 
required to make the plaintiff whole. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at§ 
908, comment c. An additional award of punitive damages would constitute a pure windfall 
to the plaintiff, unjustly enriching him at the defendant's expense. See Duffy, supra note 55, 
at 7, 8; Ghiardi, supra note 55, at 286. 
66 412 U.S. I (1973). 
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Now that Hall has made fee-shifting widely available,67 the ex-
penses of litigation may no longer pose a. serious impediment to 
suits by members against their unions. Moreover, the availability 
of damages for mental suffering may provide whatever additional 
incentive is required for litigation by union members who sustain 
little or no tangible loss from violations of their rights. Since such 
damages are often assessed generously, and in amounts larger than 
are needed to reimburse plaintiffs for out-of-pocket expenses,68 
their recoverability may significantly stimulate member-union liti-
gation. ,-\dmittedly, it has been held in some jurisdictions that 
damages for emotional distress may not be awarded under section 
102 in the absence of concomitant physical injury. 69 It would be 
preferable to make mental suffering fully compensable, however, 
rather than to permit the recovery of punitive damages. 70 
Since sufficient incentives may already exist to stimulate litiga-
tion under section 102, it is likely that, if the availability of punitive 
damages did indeed induce more lawsuits, such actions would 
more often consist of private feuding than of the vindication of 
important rights. 71 It has been argued that the value of assuring 
every union member his day in court is worth the risk of insignifi-
cant litigation. 72 To invite such litigation unnecessarily, however, 
would simply place an unwarranted load on the already overbur-
dened federal courts. Furthermore, these insignificant actions 
would impose a considerable burden on labor unions. 73 If the 
lawsuits were merely frivolous, they would waste union resources 
and hamper ordinary union activities. 74 Moreover, if the suits were 
used as a weapon by one union faction against another, the federal 
courts would inexorably be drawn into intra-union political battles. 
Such involvement by the courts in internal union affairs is undesir-
able, for it ultimately tends to undermine union self-government. 75 
67 See Comment, supra note 61; Comment, supra note 63, at 282-83. 
68 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at § 908, comment c. 
69 See note 59 supra. 
70 The availability of damages for mental suffering, even in the absence of a physical 
injury, would not only stimulate meritorious litigation under§ 102, but would also serve to 
deter union conduct proscribed by Title I and § 609, and to ensure the full compensation of 
union members whose rights are violated. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra; 
note 65 supra. Moreover, this solution would avoid the serious adverse consequences of 
awarding exemplary damages under § 102. For a discussion of those consequences, see 
notes 71-80 and accompanying text infra. 
71 Cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 16 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (The availability of 
attorney's fees under§ 102 will incite many insignificant lawsuits.). But see Cox, supra note 
II, at 852-53. 
72 Cox, supra note 11, at 853. 
73 Since there is a strong public interest in maintaining viable labor unions, see § I of the 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C § 151 (1970); § 2(a) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 
401(a) (1970), the imposition of this burden on unions may be contrary to the interests of the 
general public. 
74 See Cox, supra note 11, at 852-53. 
75 See generally A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 87-88 (1960); Leslie, 
Federal Couns and Union Fiduciaries, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1314 (1976). 
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Even if the allowance of punitive damages under section 102 did 
not provoke unwarranted litigation, it might nevertheless diminish 
the strength and stability of labor organizations. The payment of 
exemplary damage awards out of union treasuries, and indirectly 
out of the wages of union members, would tend to undermine the 
stability of unions by fomenting discord within their ranks. 76 Addi-
tionally, the satisfaction of extravagant awards of punitive dam-
ages could financially cripple some unions. Since the wealth of the 
defendant is commonly considered in assessing exemplary dam-
ages, 77 the depletion of union treasuries could be minimized by the 
observance of discretionary limitations on the amounts of punitive 
awards. 78 .Common law decisions afford little basis for optimism, 
however, that the size of exemplary awards would be effectively 
limited in this way. 79 
The danger that allowing exemplary damages under section 102 
would undermine union strength is aggravated by the strong possi-
bility that such damages would be awarded in inappropriate cases. 
It has been extremely difficult to administer the standard that 
punitive damages may be recovered only where the defendant has 
acted with malice or with a reckless indifference to the plaintiff's 
rights. 80 The substantial likelihood of arbitrary or capricious re-
sults is a significant disadvantage of allowing punitive damages 
under section 102. 
Exemplary damages at common law have sometimes been de-
fended on the ground that they inflict a well-deserved punishment 
on the defendant.81 Whether or not punishment is in itself a legiti-
mate end, however, it is unpersuasive to argue that exemplary 
damages should be awarded under section 102 in order to punish 
unions for maliciously infringing upon the rights of their members. 
Since the availability of exemplary damages would have a poten-
tially severe impact t1pon union strength and stability, it would 
76 See Brandwen, supra note 26, at 477. Any suit by a member against his union, of 
course, would be likely to provoke some disharmony among the membership. Such bitter-
ness could be expected to be particularly intense, however, where the plaintiff was awarded 
punitive damages. Exemplary damages essentially constitute a windfall to the. plaintiff. See 
note 65 supra. Union members may be more resentful of giving a windfall to one of their 
co-workers than of adequately compensating him for a tangible iajury. 
77 W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 2. at 14; see, e.g., Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 81 
L.R.R.M. 2592. 2594 (D.D.C. 1972); cf. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at 
§ 908(2) (The defendant's wealth is one of several factors to be considered in assessing 
punitive damages.). 
78 Cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 9 n. 13 (1973) (Financial crippling of unions may be avoided 
by limiting the size of awards of attorney's fees.). 
79 Brandwen, supra note 26, at 466-68. 
80 See notes 38-49 and accompanying text supra. 
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 7, at§ 908(1), comment b; C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 7, § 77, at 275,276; W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 2, at 9; Corboy, supra note 
62, at 293. 
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seriously impair the effectiveness of unions as collective bargaining 
agents. As a result, the successful plaintiff under section 102, 
together with all other union members, and indeed with the public 
generally, 82 would ultimately suffer. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that if exemplary damages are 
appropriate to punish unions, they should be awarded only within 
the confines of procedural safeguards such as proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the 
right to trial by jury. Indeed, punitive damages have been widely 
condemned as anomalous and perhaps unconstitutional in that they 
amount essentially to criminal penalties, but are imposed without 
the protection afforded by the procedural safeguards which sur-
round the criminal law. 83 A criminal defendant may be entitled to 
more stringent procedural safeguards than a civil defendant ex-
posed to liability for punitive damages, however, because of the 
greater severity of the punishment to which the former is typically 
subject. Even a convicted criminal who is not imprisoned is likely 
to be more harshly stigmatized by society than a civil defendant 
against whom punitive damages are assessed.84 
At common law, nearly every state fully recognizes the doctrine 
of exemplary damages.85 Although the House of Lords has nar-
rowly limited the recoverability of punitive damages in England,86 
no American state has restricted the doctrine in recent years. Since 
•• See note 73 supra. 
83 See, e.g., Brandwen, supra note 26, at 467-68; Duffy, supra note 55, at 7; Ford, supra 
note 58; Ghiardi, supra note 55, at 287-88. 
84 See Note, supra note 54, at 1180-81; Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive 
Damages Defendant, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 408, 408-12 (1967). 
85 Forty states which accept the doctrine of punitive damages without qualification are 
listed in C. McCORMICK, supra note 7, § 78, at 278 n.2. Since this list was compiled, Alaska 
and Hawaii have also fully accepted the doctrine of exemplary damages. Bridges v. Alaska 
Hous. Auth., 375 P.2d 696 (Alaska 1962); Howell v. Associated Hotels, Ltd., 40 Hawaii 492 
(1954). 
Four states (Louisiana,, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington) entirely reject puni-
tive damages. Vincent v. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 
(1917); Boott Mills v. Boston & Maine R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914); Riewe v. 
McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (1881); Wilson v. Sun Pub. Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 P. 
774 (1915). 
Indiana permits exemplary damages only in cases in which the defendant's conduct is not 
also punishable criminally. Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 61 Am. Dec. 96 (1854). Connecticut 
allows punitive damages, but limits them to the amount of the plaintiff's litigation expenses. 
Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 A. 640 (1917). Michigan and New Hampshire award 
exemplary damages not as a punishment, but rather on the theory that they constitute extra 
compensation of the plaintiff for wounded feelings or a sense of outrage. Hasted v. Van 
Wagnen, 243 Mich. 350,220 N.W. 762 (1928); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 
(1922); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456, 22 Am. Rep. 475 (1876). 
86 Rookes v. Barnard, [ 1964] A.C. 1129, 1220-33, held that punitive damages may only be 
awarded in cases in which (I) they are expressly authorized by statute, (2) government 
servants have acted oppressively or arbitrarily, or (3) the defendant's conduct was calcu-
lated to make a profit for himself which might well exceed the compensation payable to the 
plaintiff. 
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it has been subjected to severe and prevalent criticism,87 however, 
it may not be advisable to extend the doctrine of punitive damages 
to a class of cases like those arising under section 102 of the 
LMRDA, where its value is highly questionable. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Both the language and the legislative history of section 102 of the 
LMRDA leave unsettled the question of whether a plaintiff may be 
awarded punitive damages. The case law on this issue is likewise 
inconclusive; the conflicting decisions of the courts cannot be 
reconciled on the basis of any relevant factor. An analysis of the 
decisions reveals that, in jurisdictions which sustain the availability 
of exemplary damages under section 102, determining when these 
damages should actually be awarded has been extremely difficult. 
Frequently, the results of the cases have been unpredictable, if not 
arbitrary or capricious. 
The risk that such results will be reached cannot be justified by 
any countervailing benefit of awarding punitive damages under 
section 102. The availability of exemplary damages is unnecessary 
either to deter unions from infringing upon the rights of their 
members, or to induce injured members to sue to vindicate their 
rights. If the lure of punitive damages did increase the volume of 
litigation under section 102, moreover, many of the new lawsuits 
would likely be groundless. As a result, the proper functioning of 
both labor unions and the federal courts would be impaired. 
Even if awards of punitive damages under section 102 did not 
provoke unwarranted litigation, they would nevertheless tend to 
undermine the strength and stability of unions by creating dishar-
mony among their members, and by seriously threatening to de-
plete union treasuries. Ultimately, all union members, together 
with the public, would suffer the consequences. Under these cir-
cumstances, it seems highly inappropriate to extend the doctrine of 
punitive damages to cases arising under section 102 of the 
LMRDA. 
--S. Thomas Wienner 
87 See, e.g., Brandwen, supra note 26; Duffy, supra note 55; Ford, supra note 58; Ghiardi, 
supra note 55. 
